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We simulated epidemic projections of a potential COVID-19 outbreak in a residential university population in the United States under varying combinations of asymptomatic tests (5% to 33% per day), transmission rates (2.5% to 14%), and contact rates (1 to 25), to identify the contact rate threshold that, if exceeded, would lead to exponential growth in infections. Using this, we extracted contact rate thresholds among non-essential workers, population size thresholds in the absence of vaccines, and vaccine coverage thresholds. We further stream-lined our analyses to transmission rates of 5 to 8%, to correspond to the reported levels of face-mask-use/physical-distancing during the 2020 pandemic. Our results suggest that, in the absence of vaccines, testing alone without reducing population size would not be sufficient to control an outbreak. If the population size is lowered to 34% (or 44%) of the actual population size to maintain contact rates at 4 (or 7) among non-essential workers, mass tests at 25% (or 33%) per day would help control an outbreak. With the availability of vaccines, the campus can be kept at full population provided at least 95% are vaccinated. If vaccines are partially available such that the coverage is lower than 95%, keeping at full population would require asymptomatic testing, either mass tests at 25% per day if vaccine coverage is at 63–79%, or mass tests at 33% per day if vaccine coverage is at 53–68%. If vaccine coverage is below 53%, to control an outbreak, in addition to mass tests at 33% per day, it would also require lowering the population size to 90%, 75%, and 60%, if vaccine coverage is at 38–53%, 23–38%, and below 23%, respectively. Threshold estimates from this study, interpolated over the range of transmission rates, can collectively help inform campus level preparedness plans for adoption of face mask/physical-distancing, testing, remote instructions, and personnel scheduling, during non-availability or partial-availability of vaccines, in the event of SARS-Cov2-type disease outbreaks. 

Contact tracing is a well-established and effective approach for the containment of the spread of infectious diseases. While Bluetooth-based contact tracing method using phones has become popular recently, these approaches suffer from the need for a critical mass adoption to be effective. In this paper, we present WiFiTrace, a network-centric approach for contact tracing that relies on passive WiFi sensing with no client-side involvement. Our approach exploits WiFi network logs gathered by enterprise networks for performance and security monitoring, and utilizes them for reconstructing device trajectories for contact tracing. Our approach is specifically designed to enhance the efficacy of traditional methods, rather than to supplant them with new technology. We designed an efficient graph algorithm to scale our approach to large networks with tens of thousands of users. The graph-based approach outperforms an indexed PostgresSQL in memory by at least 4.5X without any index update overheads or blocking. We have implemented a full prototype of our system and deployed it on two large university campuses. We validated our approach and demonstrate its efficacy using case studies and detailed experiments using real-world WiFi datasets.